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The thirtieth anniversary of the enactment of the modem
Endangered Species Act (ESA) offers an irresistible excuse to suggest
changes that are needed to set the statute, and the larger project of
environmental protection, on course for greater effectiveness. The 1973
ESA is novel in its approach and reach, in that it reflects both the
resource management and pollution control traditions in environmental
law. Its evolution indicates broader trends in the legal landscape of
environmental law.
Making predictions about the future of the ESA is a daunting task.
Most predictions made thirty years ago about the statute proved to be
wrong. The existence of three inconsistent, but equally plausible stories
describing the past thirty years of environmental lawhistory compound
the problem, providing little basis upon which to project past trends
onto the future.
More useful than venturing guesses about the future is describing
what changes we need to make in order to fulfil the promise of the
ESA. Rather than speculating about the statute's future path, we must
carefully plan that path with prescriptions for reform in three major
areas: better funding for the ESA program, technology-based
limitations to control habitat degradation, and preventative care for
biodiversity.
I. INTRO DUCTIO N ................................................................................................................ 452
II. CANARY IN A COAL MINE: THE ESA AS AN INDICATOR OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW TRENDS ....................................................................................... 454
A. The ESA Reflects Resource Management Law ............................................... 455
1. Consultation Requirem ents ............................................................................ 455
2. Take Prohibitions ............................................................................................ 456
3. Land A cquisition .............................................................................................. 457
B. The ESA Reflects Pollution Control Law ......................................................... 459
(D Robert L. Fischman, 2004. Professor and Louis F. Niezer Faculty Fellow, Indiana University
School of Law-Bloomington. John Applegate generously let me borrow his marvelous phrase
for the title of this Article. J.B. Ruhl offered many insightful suggestions on an earlier draft. I
owe many thanks to my librarian colleague, Jennifer Bryan, and to my research assistants,
Elizabeth Holgate and Ben Mills, for their excellent help. Finally, I am grateful to Derek Teaney
and the editorial staff of Environmental Lawfor their diligent editing.
[451]
452 ENVIRONMENTAL LA W [Vol. 34:451
1. Citizen S uits ...................................................................................................... 459
2. Cooperative Federalism .................................................................................. 461
3. Substantive Criteria Through Permitting ..................................................... 463
C. C on clusion ............................................................................................................ 465
III. THE DIRECTOR'S CUT: THREE ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF THE PAST .................................. 466
A. The Fall from Grace ............................................................................................ 468
B. Onward and Up ward ........................................................................................... 469
C. The R oller Coaster .............................................................................................. 470
IV. PRESCRIPTIONS FOR ESA RECOVERY .............................................................................. 471
A . Fu dlng the Program .......................................................................................... 471
B. Technology-Based Linitations to Protect Habitat ......................................... 475
C. Preventive Health Care for Biodivensity .......................................................... 479
V . C ONCLU SIO N ................................................................................................................... 48 0
I. INTRODUCTION
The thirtieth anniversary of the enactment of the modem Endangered
Species Act (ESA) provides an excellent opportunity to look back and muse
about the future of environmental law. There is no magic to the number
thirty, whose roundness is a fluke of our base-ten numerical system.2 But
three decades is an adequate time span within which to discern the slow and
deep trends in public policy. The ESA bridges the divide between the
pollution control and resource management fields of environmental law.
Thus, its history, successes, and shortcomings reveal the conjunction,
strengths, and weaknesses of both fields.
Moreover, ESA disputes arise when the fabric of nature wears so thin
that it begins to fray. Where degradation occurs steadily and in small
increments, it is easy to overlook cumulative harms and continue business
as usual. But the triggers of the ESA jolt us out of complacency and invite
reconsideration of long-standing practices.3 As Holly Doremus and Dan
Tarlock have meticulously illustrated, the ESA played just such a role in the
Klamath Basin, where endangered fishes forced the federal government to
shut off irrigation water to farmers.' Federal reclamation law, state water
law, and federal water quality law all failed to forestall accumulating
I Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
2 Indeed, for the purposes of this broad-brush analysis, we might as well talk about the
37th anniversary of the predecessor to the modem ESA, the now-repealed Endangered Species
Preservation Act of 1966, which was the first comprehensive attempt to deal with the extinction
problem. Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926, repealed by Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 14, 87 Stat. 884, 903
(1973). The 1966 law was followed by the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L.
No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275, repealed by Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 14, 87 Stat. 884, 903 (1973).
3 See Joseph L. Sax, Environmental Law at the Turn of the Century A Reportorial
Fragment of Contemporary Histor, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2375, 2395 (2000) (examining the Platte
River water dispute and the ESA's role as a catalyst for bringing all parties to the negotiation).
4 Holly Doremus & A- Dan Tarlock, Fish, Farms, and the Clash of Cultures in the KIamath
Basin, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 279, 306-16 (2003).
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problems of the basin. Finally, it was the ESA's "no jeopardy" mandate5 that
derailed the status quo and required the irrigation shutdown. This action
brought to a head long-simmering problems of unsustainable practices that
were impolitic and painful to address.
Without the ESA to force the issue, the Klamath Basin and its ecology
surely would have continued their steady slide toward ruin. As the legal
Cassandra, the ESA forces us to confront uncomfortable weaknesses in our
environmental stewardship that cut across the entire spectrum of
environmental laws. One example discussed in this Article is the almost
complete lack of controls on environmental harms associated with
agricultural activities.6
Despite its usefulness as a vehicle for exploring the broad issues of
environmental law, the anniversary of the ESA presents some limitations.
First, though the 1973 law dramatically departed from the limited authorities
and mandates of prior legislation, it does not mark the beginning of federal
species recovery efforts. Congress enacted its first law focused on
endangered species protection in 1966. 7 But even that statute had roots that
trace back to the 1900 Lacey Act,8 which sought to restrict interstate traffic
in wildlife contraband that was decimating many species through illegal
market hunting.9
Second, the modem ESA did not hatch as a fully developed law in 1973.
Significant revisions in 1978, 1982, and 1988 extended and strengthened the
framework established in 1973. Moreover, the administrative decisions made
in the 1980s and 1990s strongly influenced contemporary implementation.
However, compared to other environmental laws, the 1973 ESA was
novel in its approach and reach. Furthermore, it has resisted persistent calls
for major changes in its structure. The ESA serves quite well as a vehicle for
examining the development of environmental law. The occasion of its
thirtieth anniversary offers an irresistible excuse to suggest changes that are
needed to set it, and the larger project of environmental protection, on
course for greater effectiveness.
This Article begins by explaining how the ESA reflects both the
resource management and pollution control traditions in environmental law.
An evaluation of the ESA indicates more than just the status and trends of a
single law. Like the canary in a coal mine, it responds to the legal
atmosphere around it. The first Section demonstrates this by describing six
key tools employed in the ESA and tracing their origins in other
environmental law programs.
The second Section despairs at the viability of making predictions
about the future of any environmental law, with special focus on the ESA.
Most predictions made thirty years ago about the future of the ESA proved
5 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000).
6 See discussion infra Section IV.B.
7 Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926.
8 The Lacey Act of 1900, Ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (1900) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 16 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
9 THOMAS A. LUND, AMERICAN WILDLIFE LAw 87 (1980).
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to be wrong. In addition, there are three inconsistent but equally plausible
stories that describe the past thirty years of environmental law history.
Therefore, there is little basis upon which to project past trends onto the
future.
The third Section of this Article turns from predictions to prescriptions.
More useful than venturing guesses about the future is describing what
changes we need to make in order to fulfill the promise of the ESA. The
major reforms necessary to maintain and recover species fall into three
categories: better funding for the ESA program, technology-based limitations
to control habitat degradation, and preventive care for biodiversity.
II. CANARY IN A COAL MINE: THE ESA AS AN INDICATOR OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW TRENDS
More than any other environmental law, the ESA manifests the full
range of attributes distinguishing the field from other areas of law.
Implementation of the ESA has produced a record that mirrors the fate of
many approaches to environmental law. Environmentalists often deploy the
canary in a coal mine rationale to defend the ESA's unrelenting concern for
the survival of all species: Extinction of any one life form is an indication of
a weakening in the fabric of nature that might ultimately cause harm to us.
In another sense, the ESA itself serves as a canary to determine the
viability of legal tools designed to achieve the public goals of environmental
law. Changes underway in the use of legal mechanisms shared with other
laws might signal trends that will soon shape the ESA. Understanding such
changes will help in predicting the future direction of endangered species
policy.
The ESA uniquely bridges the gap between the resource management
and pollution control fields of environmental law. Though environmental
lawyers and commentators generally sort themselves and their subjects into
one of these two pigeon holes, they are closely related. Roughly speaking,
resource management law controls the use of the environment as a source
of valuable goods. It is rooted most directly in the concern for sustainable
harvests of renewable products (e.g., timber, fish) and the allocation of
nonrenewable treasures (e.g., minerals, wilderness). In contrast, pollution
control law restricts the use of the environment as a sink for wastes. It is
rooted most directly in public health concerns and problems of
contamination. Though both branches of environmental law flourished in
the wake of the social changes of the 1960s, both have been concerns of law
for centuries. However, the federal government began playing a more active
role in resource management much earlier than it did in pollution control, at
least in part because of the huge amount of valuable resources it owned.
This Section describes how the ESA is an unusual hybrid of resource
management and pollution control law. It illustrates this by tracing the
development of six key tools employed in the ESA. The first three tool types
originate in the century-old resource management tradition: consultation
requirements, take prohibitions, and land acquisition. The second three tool
types are more recent and are associated with the environmentalist reforms
[Vol. 34:451
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of the late 1960s and 1970s: citizen suits, cooperative federalism, and the
application of substantive criteria through permitting. Like the well-adapted
insects that, among all the animals, do most of nature's work, the ESA
moves on six legs. If reforms to the ESA program are to succeed over the
next thirty years, all six of these appendages of environmental law will have
to operate in concert. An understanding of these six tools is necessary to see
the limitations of and the opportunities for the ESA.
A. The ESA Reflects Resource Management Law
The aim of the ESA, to prevent extinction, is an extension of the great
American wildlife law tradition of conservation. The resource management
law roots of the ESA penetrate deeply into nineteenth century legislation
responding to unsustainable hunting and trapping. The rise of the
Progressive era conservation movement in the 1900s seeking to limit private
exploitation of public natural resources led to numerous federal restrictions
on what had been regarded as open commons.
In addition to its conservation objective, the ESA displays its resource
management law heritage in its two key provisions. Section 7 of the ESA
1° is
an outgrowth of a classic resource management tool: consultation. Section 9
of the ESA1 borrows the language and approach of the harvest restriction
laws originally designed to maintain game and other commercial animal
populations at sustainable levels. Finally, though not now at the center of
the ESA program, the provision authorizing land acquisition also resonates
deeply with resource management law. 12
1. Consultation Requirements
Like the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934,11 the ESA employs
interagency consultation as a tool for improving decisions. 14 This common
resource management law tool, which achieves its apotheosis in the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),15 has long been used to force
agencies to broaden their mission orientation to consider conservation
concerns.
Under the 1934 law, federal permitees or agencies involved in water
control or modification projects must consult with the United States Fish
10 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2000).
11 Id. § 1538.
12 Id § 1534.
13 Ch. 55, 48 Stat. 401 (1934) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-667).
14 Compare 16 U.S.C. § 662 (2000), with 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2000). The consultation process of
the ESA is much more detailed than the process in the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act.
15 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370e (2000). NEPA
mandates an interdisciplinary analysis of proposed federal actions. This requires an action
agency both to consult with relevant state and federal natural resources agencies about
anticipated effects and to engage biological scientists (either in-house or through private
consultants) to write an evaluation.
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and Wildlife Service (FWS) regarding impacts on wildlife and mitigation. 16
Consultation is designed to slow down headlong rushes to complete ill-
considered projects and to provide an outside opinion on possible
consequences for biological resources. This is the heart of the 1973 ESA
consultation procedure, which requires agencies authorizing, funding, or
carrying out projects that may affect a listed species to consult with FWS or
NOAA Fisheries (collectively, the Services) before proceeding.
The ESA represented a significant advance for the consultation tool.
The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act and its progeny, including the 1966
National Historic Preservation Act,'7 and NEPA,' s require consultation and
analyses of the effects of an agency's (or, permitee's) proposed action.
However, they do not provide a substantive threshold of an impact beyond
which the law will prevent the action from going forward. The 1973 ESA's
"no jeopardy" standard added a powerful, substantive bite to the old
resource management consultation procedure. Still, a surprising number of
ESA disputes center, NEPA-like, around the adequacy of the consultation
analysis.'" The FWS field staff spends more time on consultation than on any
other ESA program. 2 °
2. Take Prohibitions
The prohibition on take in section 9 of the ESA21 is an outgrowth of
older resource management laws, most famously the 1918 Migratory Bird
Treaty Act."2 The take prohibition was first employed to limit wildlife harvest
activities, such as hunting and trapping. When overexploitation is the chief
threat to a group of species, take prohibitions are effective conservation
tools. The take prohibition crops up throughout the last century in resource
conservation laws, such as the 1966 National Wildlife Refuge Administration
Act.23 The definition of take broadened somewhat from the hunting-related
16 16 U.S.C. § 662(a) (2000).
17 16 U.S.C. § 470f (2000).
18 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000).
19 See, e.g, Selkirk Conservation Alliance v. Forsgren, 336 F.3d 944, 965 (9th Cir. 2003)(holding FWS's biological opinion adequately examined future impacts of the proposed
activity); Cascadia Wildiands Project v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 219 F. Supp. 2d
1142, 1150 (D. Or. 2002) (granting a preliminary injunction because serious questions were
raised concerning the adequacy of FWS's biological opinion); S.F. Baykeeper v. United States
Army Corps of Engr's, 219 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1021 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding the scope of FWS's
biological opinion was adequate); Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, 130 F. Supp. 2d 121, 126(D.D.C. 2001) (finding that FWS's biological opinion did not examine cumulative effects
sufficiently).
20 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-581, ENDANGERED SPECIES PROGRAM:
INFORMATION ON How FUNDS ARE ALLOCATED AND WHAT ACTIVITIES ARE EMPHASIZED 14-18 (2002)
(reporting that FWS field staff spent 42% of its time on consultation, compared to the next most
time-consuming activity, recovery, at 28% of its time), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02581.pdf.
21 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2000).
22 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (2000).
23 16 U.S.C. § 668ee(15) (2000).
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terms of the 1918 law,24 through the concern over collection in the 1966 law,
to the 1973 inclusion of "harm" and "harass." The basic mechanism of
prohibiting a class of activities harmful to species, unless specifically
permitted by an agency, is a classic wildlife law tool.
From listed migratory birds in 1918 to listed threatened and endangered
species in 1973, federal statutory law traces a steady arc of growth in the
range of species (including eagles2" and marine mammals26 ) protected by
take restrictions. The 1973 ESA broke new ground in two respects. First, it
brought new kinds of species under federal harvest restrictions. In addition
to the species valuable for sport hunting (such as ducks), commercial
exploitation (such as ocean fishes), and national pride (such as bald eagles
(Haliaeetus leucocephalus)), the ESA provides protection to any plant or
animal on the brink of extinction other than certain insect pests. Such
uncharismatic microfauna (and flora) as the Delhi Sands flower-loving fly
(Rhaphiomidas terninatus abdominalis), the furbish lousewort (Pediculats
furbishiae), and the snail darter (Pereina tanasi) received widely publicized
protection under the ESA.
Second, the ESA expanded the traditional scope of take limitations,
which formerly covered only direct hunting, collecting, harassment, or
pursuing, to include harm.27 Harm, undefined by the statute, is a broader
term embracing indirect adverse effects to species, such as habitat
destruction incidental to otherwise lawful activities.2" Recent developments
in the administration of the ESA now employ the harm limitation on habitat
modification in a manner that encourages people involved in habitat-
disturbing activities to develop conservation and mitigation plans. In this
respect, the cutting edge of harvest method restrictions now overlaps with
the broad scale regulation of private activities to protect habitat.2 9
3. Land Acquisition
Land acquisition to protect wildlife has its origins in the federal
reserves set aside as refuges. This approach to resource conservation began
to flourish with Theodore Roosevelt's 1903 proclamation protecting Pelican
Island as a "preserve and breeding ground for native birds."3 Roosevelt was
responding to the decimation of egrets (Egretta spp.), white ibises
24 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2000).
25 Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act of 1940,16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (2000).
26 Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421h (2000).
27 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2000).
28 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2004); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S.
687 (1995).
29 Robert L. Fischman, Law-Biological Conservation, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD
ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY (S. Krech [II et al. eds., 2004).
30 Executive Order of March 14, 1903. See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, PELICAN ISLAND
NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE: AMERICA'S FIRST, available at
http://southeast.fws.gov/pubs/plcgen.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2004).
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(Eudocimus albus), roseate spoonbills (Aqjja i 'a), and other plumage birds
hunted for the fashion and costume industry.3
The numbers of wildlife refuges did not significantly rise until Congress
first authorized in 1929,32 and then funded in 1934,1 habitat acquisition to
support waterfowl.34 After that, land acquisition to support wildlife
conservation became a central element in federal resource management.
The Fish and Wildlife Act of 195635 expanded the ability of the federal
government to acquire wildlife refuge lands for any kind of habitat need.
Coupled with funding from the Land and Water Conservation Fund
established in 1964 legislation and expanded in 1966,36 these land acquisition
statutes created hundreds of national wildlife refuges.37 Until the ESA, the
refuge system was the principal federal program to sustain populations of
imperiled species.
Indeed, the original 1966 Federal Endangered Species Preservation Act
was one half of a two-part statute designed to advance conservation.3 The
other half is commonly called the 1966 National Wildlife Refuge
Administration Act. Both laws were part of a single act. Land acquisition to
protect and restore animals threatened with extinction was a key tool of the
endangered species program. Many of those lands became parts of national
wildlife refuges, managed under the Administration Act's consolidated
authority for the refuge system.
Land acquisition has not been a dominant part of the ESA program as
implemented." But, in 1973, the drafters of the ESA thought it would be.
Justice Scalia makes much of this legislative history in his dissent in Babbitt
v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon.40 His quotations
from the House and Senate floor managers who identified land acquisition as
an important solution to the habitat degradation problem represent the
common understanding at the time. In addition, a key committee report from
1973 identifies the ESA land acquisition provision as relieving critical
restrictions placed on the earlier refuge acquisition authorities.41 Land
acquisition does quietly hum along at a respectable magnitude of tens of
millions of dollars per year but is nowhere near the centerpiece of species
31 ROBERT L. FISCHMAN, THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGES: COORDINATING A CONSERVATION
SYSTEM THROUGH LAw 35 (2003).
32 Migratory Bird Conservation Act of 1929, 16 U.S.C. §§ 715-715r (2000).
33 Migratory Bird Hunting Stamp Act of 1934, 16 U.S.C. § 718 (2000).
34 FISCHMAN, supra note 31, at 38.
35 Ch. 1036, 70 Stat. 1119 (1956) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 742a-742j-2).
36 16 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4 to 4601-11 (2000).
37 A more detailed description of these and other, more narrowly focused authorities can be
found at Robert L. Fischman, The National Wildlife Refuge System and the Hallmarks of
Modem Organic Legislation, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 457, 473-76 (2002).
38 Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (1966).
39 On the other hand, threatened and endangered species habitat protection remains a key
function of the refuge system. Over 10% of the national wildlife refuges were acquired for listed
species protection. Overall, the refuge system harbors 180 animal and 78 plant species listed
under the ESA. FISCBMAN, supra note 31, at 29.
40 515 U.S. 687, 728-29 (1995).
41 S. REP. No. 93-307, at 4 (1973).
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recovery. Almost immediately after enactment, the ESA caught the powerful
current of the regulatory trends shaping pollution control law and was swept
in a different direction.
B. The ESA Reflects Pollution Control Law
The ESA is very much a product of the great surge of pollution control
legislation prompted by the modem environmental movement. This
movement introduced new public health concerns about environmental
quality into federal legislation. Richard Andrews, like many commentators,
marks 1970 as the beginning of a "fundamentally new era."42 In many ways,
Congress enacted the 1973 ESA at the very crest of the wave of bipartisan
support for new national laws protecting the quality of land, air, and 
water.43
After the exhaustive debates and massive additions to the United States
Code produced by the 1970 Clean Air Act 4 and 1972 Clean Water Act
(CWA),4 5 the ESA seemed like a slight, uncontroversial undertaking. It
passed on a vote of 355 to 4 in the House
46 and unanimously in the Senate.
47
As a product of its time in the midst of the period when national
pollution controls arose, the ESA reflects important approaches pioneered
in environmental quality lawmaking. This Section highlights three key
approaches: citizen suits, cooperative federalism, and substantive criteria to
control degradation activities through permitting.
1. Citizen Suits
Since 1946, the Administrative Procedure Act' has provided a cause of
action allowing aggrieved citizens to seek judicial review of agency
decisions.49 For most resource management statutes, this is the sole door
through which stakeholders not the subject of an agency order may enter
the courthouse. However, the pollution control statutes sought to widen
public participation, in part, by making agency actions and regulated
activities more vulnerable to legal challenges. The threat of suit would
increase citizen leverage in working with an agency and judicial review
would provide disinterested oversight of implementation. In this respect, the
42 RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 227 (1999).
43 Borrowing Fred Cheever's wonderful metaphor, the ESA was "hatched" in the nest of
modem pollution control law. Federico Cheever and Michael Balster, The Take Prohffbition in
Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act: Contradictions, Ugly Duckings, and Conservation of
Species, 34 ENVTL. L. 363,385 (2004).
44 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000).
45 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
46 See 119 CONG. REC. 42,915-16 (Dec. 20, 1973) for the roll-call vote.
47 The standard reference for the legislative history of the 1973 ESA is SENATE COMMITTEE
ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF
1973 (1982).
48 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (2000).
49 Id § 702.
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pollution control chapter of environmental legal history contributed to the
broader reformation of administrative law. 50
The ESA shares with the pollution control statutes a liberal citizen suit
provision that spells out the complaints that courts must hear.51 More
significantly, though, the ESA adopted the approach of the CWA in allowing
citizens to act as roving, private attorneys general.52 Under this provision,
any person may sue to enjoin any other person or agency that is alleged to
be in violation of the law.
As Zygmunt Plater has pointed out, the citizen suit provision enabled
environmental law to be "predominantly created and shaped by active
citizens, operating from positions outside official . . . governing
institutions."5 This pluralistic attribute of pollution control law goes beyond
the Progressive reliance on agency expertise. It invites the "attentive
monitoring" that distinguishes many of the outstanding successes in
environmental law.'
The ESA is a particularly strong example of citizen-driven
implementation. For instance, private litigation under the citizen suit
provision has dominated the interpretation of the section 9 take prohibition
as applied to habitat degrading activities. 5 Agency enforcement in this areahas been miniscule. More broadly, citizen groups have played an influential
role in shaping all aspects of the ESA program. For instance, litigation has
driven the listing and critical habitat programs of section 4 for many years
now.56 Furthermore, litigation to force agencies to meet their section 7
50 ANDREWS, supra note 42, at 240-41; see generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975).
51 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2000); MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF
NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 265 (3d ed. 1997).
52 See ANDREWS, supra note 42, at 240-41 (discussing the impact of citizen suit provisions
on the regulatory process). Professor Joseph L. Sax advocated this approach in his 1970 path-
breaking book, Defending the Envronlnent
53 Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the Beginning A Fundamental Shift of Paradigms A Theory
andShort History ofEnvironmentalLaw, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 981,982 (1994) (emphasis added).
54 William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Seven Statutory Wonders of the US Environmental Law:
Origins and Morpholog, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1009, 1019-21(1994) (arguing citizen suits help
sustain enthusiasm for the law at the level of monitoring and enforcement).
55 See, e.g., Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N. R.R., 23 F.3d 1508, 1509 (9th Cir. 1994)(holding there was not degradation that significantly impaired essential behavioral patterns
where habitat of an endangered species was affected by a grain spill); Am. Bald Eagle v. Bhatti,9 F.3d 163, 166 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding no evidence of actual harm to bald eagles as a result ofpossible ingestion of lead-contaminated deer meat); Defenders of Wildlife v. Administrator,
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 882 F.2d 1294, 1301 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding the EPA's registration ofpesticides containing strychnine was a take where endangered species had eaten the pesticide
and died); Palla v. Haw. Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 852 F.2d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 1988)(holding that habitat destruction that could drive an endangered species into extinction falls
within the Secretary's interpretation of harm); Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 639
F.2d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that grazing sheep and goats in the critical habitat of an
endangered species was a taking only where the complete eradication of the livestock would
prevent harm to the endangered species).
56 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 20, at 21-23.
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Another hallmark of pollution control legislation is the use of
cooperative federalism. Cooperative federalism creates a set of minimum
national standards that the federal government will implement, if necessary.
However, it invites states to implement their own programs and criteria, so
long as they rise above the floor established by the federal government.
States typically are responsible both for issuing permits (e.g., Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System permits for water pollution control)58 and for
designing comprehensive plans (e.g., statue implementation plans to reduce
air polution)5 under guidelines set by the federal government.
60
States and local jurisdictions have several incentives to work with the
federal government to seek federal authorization for these pollution control
programs. First, although they do not enjoy unbounded discretion under
federal oversight, states do gain a fair amount of leeway in tailoring the
program to their particular needs and goals. Second, through grants and
cooperative agreements, participating states can get 
federal money.61
Finally, the constituents of state and local governments frequently prefer to
deal directly with their local governments than with federal agencies.
Likewise, these state and local governments generally believe themselves to
be less bureaucratic and more responsive to the needs of their area than the
federal agencies.
57 See, e.g., Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding
agency duty to consult on a long range management plan); Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441,
1462 (9th Cir. 1988) (enjoining proposed oil leasing due to inadequacy of biological opinion);
Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1389 (9th Cir. 1987) (enjoining proposed action due to
agency's failure to reinitiate consultation upon receipt of new information from expert peer
agency); Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comn'n v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041, 1057 (1st Cir. 1982)
(remanding proposed permit due to inadequacy of consultation); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153, 173-74 (1978) (finding agency duty to avoid jeopardy).
58 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7661a (2000) (state permitting of emission
sources under the Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949 (2000) (state permitting for solid
waste disposal under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act).
59 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410, 7502 (2000); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1288(b) (2000) (outlining area-wide
waste treatment management plans); id § 1329(b) (establishing state management program to
control nonpoint source water pollution).
6o For descriptions of how cooperative federalism works in pollution control law, see
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 3.1 (Sheldon M. Novick
ed., 2003); ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3.2(A) (Celia
Campbell-Mohn et al. eds., 1993); David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement
in a "Reinvented" State/Federal Relationship. The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 30-43 (2000); Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots
& Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1174-78 (1995).
61 In the case of the state implementation plan program of the Clean Air Act, states may lose




With the federal backstop, pollution control laws prevent a race to the
bottom without commandeering the state governments by "'directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program."' 2
Indeed, the federal money flowing from pollution control legislation, though
it comes with many strings, has been a significant source of public works
funding and support for modernization of state administrative apparatus.
The senior-junior partnership of cooperative federalism has been largely
absent from federal resource management, where the federal government
generally runs the entire show.
Section 6 of the ESA requires the Services to "cooperate to the
maximum extent practicable with the States."' Like most federal pollution
control statutes, which allow a state law to control if it is more stringent
than the federal program, the ESA does not preempt a more protective state
taking prohibition.' Despite some conflicting statutory language,65 the
federal ESA take prohibitions continue to preempt more permissive state
rules even if the state rules are part of an approved cooperative agreement.66
Section 6 contains programs to funnel management authority and funds to
states developing programs, regulations, and reserves for listed species. The
Services are required to approve any state conservation program that meets
the statutory criteria 6 Approved programs become cooperative agreements
between the state and the Services. States are eligible to receive federal
funding to cover up to 90% of the cost of an approved cooperative
agreement.' Section 6 funding has increased steadily in the past dozen
years, from 1% of the FWS budget in 1990 ($6.7 million),69 to 3% in 2000($26.9 million), 0 to 9% in 2002 ($81.0 million), the most recently passed
budget.71 Also, a qualified state employee acting under a cooperative
62 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). Though there is little doubt that the
national standards established by environmental laws prevent states from competing with each
other to lower regulation, there is some debate about whether such a race would occur in the
absence of a federal floor. See generally Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal
Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535 (1997); Kirsten Engel,
State En vironmental Standard-Setting.. Is There a "Race"and Is It "To the Bottom " 48 HASTINGS
L.J. 271 (1997); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Compedtion: Rethinking the "Race-
to-the-Bottom "Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992).
63 16 U.S.C. § 1535(a) (2000).
64 Id § 1535(c), (f).
65 Compareid §§ 1533(d), 1535(g)(2)(A), with id § 1535(f).
66 Swan View Coalition v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923, 939 (D. Mont. 1992); United States v.Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1133 (E.D. Cal. 1992); BEAN & ROWLAND, supra
note 51, at 269-70; Christine Golightly, Student Article, The Oregon Coastal Salmon Restoration
iiative: A FlawedAttempt toAvoidESA Listing, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 398, 449-51 (1999).
67 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c) (2000).
6 Id § 1535(d)(2).
69 Dep't of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-512, 104
Stat. 1915, 1918 (1991).
70 Dep't of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-291, 114
Stat. 922, 926-27 (2001).
71 Dep't of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117
Stat. 11, 220, 222 (2003).
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agreement may, under certain conditions, take a listed species covered by
the agreement without risking section 9 liability.72
Though these programs have played a relatively minor role in ESA
implementation compared to the similar cooperative federalism programs in
the pollution control area, the ESA authorization is strikingly strong. 3
Cooperative programs are bound to play an increasingly important role in
ESA implementation in the near future. Even more striking, but unsurprising
given the period in which Congress enacted section 6, is the legislative
history's emphasis on cooperative federalism.74 Much of the discussion in
hearings and the floor debate centered on the assurance that states would
play a large role in implementing the ESA.75 Without this understanding the
law likely would not have passed by such overwhelming majorities. For
instance, the 1973 report of the Senate bill emphasized that:
[Tihe most efficient way to enforce the prohibitions of this bill and to develop
the most appropriate and extensive programs is through utilization of the
agencies already established for such purposes within the States and
development of the potential for such State programs where they do not
already exist .... It was found that if the Federal government were to embark
on an attempt to manage and regulate endangered fish and wildlife nationwide,
administration would necessarily be considerably extended. The Committee
decided that the most effective way to fulfill the provisions of the Act was
through delegation of authority to approved State agencies.
76
Though the enacted ESA cut back somewhat on the Senate bill's initial
allocation of responsibility in favor of the states, the conference committee's
compromise affirmed the importance of cooperative federalism.
77
Unlike the pollution control cooperative agreements, the ESA has no
provision to allow states to take over a federal permit program, i.e., section
10. Nonetheless, section 4(d) can be employed to allow states to create new
(and use existing) permit programs to meet the recovery goals of the Act,
while obviating the need for citizens to apply for federal section 10 permits.7'
3. Substantive Criteria Through Permitting
The pollution statutes of environmental law employ prohibitions
generally as gatekeepers to ensure that all environmentally degrading
72 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.21(c)(5), 17.31(b) (2004).
73 BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 51, at 268-69.
74 See SHANNON PETERSEN, ACTING FOR ENDANGERED SPECIES: THE STATUTORY ARK 28 (2002)
(discussing congressional debates about preemption of state authority).
75 Professor Holly Doremus documents these discussions well in Delisting Endangered
Species: An Aspirational Goal, Not a Realistic Expectation, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,434,10,441 (2000).
76 S. REP. No. 93-307, at 4-5 (1973).
77 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 93-740, at 25-26 (1973).
78 Robert L. Fischman & Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson for Conservation from Pollution
Control Law. Cooperative Federalism for Recovery Under the Endangered Species Act 27
COLuM. J. ENVTL. L. 45, 168-72 (2002).
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activities are controlled through permits. Unlike the take prohibitions in
traditional resource management law which constitute absolute
proscriptions, the prohibitions in pollution control law merely trigger the
requirement of agency approval. So, the CWA prohibition on the "discharge
of any pollutant"7 9 operates primarily as a basis for requiring dischargers to
conduct their activities in accordance with substantive criteria in permits.
In 1973, the ESA prohibition against take was a classic resource
management provision, drawing a line that no activity could cross. However,
after the 1982 amendments, it became a basis for closer regulation of habitat
degradation. The 1982 amendments created the section 10(a) incidental take
permit program.'0 The permit allows otherwise prohibited harms (one
element in the ESA definition of take is "harm")81 in exchange for a habitat
conservation plan (HCP) and a number of other commitments, such as steps
to mitigate impacts and fund the HCP.8 2 Congress created the permit
program in 1982 at the request of a coalition of developers, municipal
governments, and a local environmental organization.' These groups had
reached an agreement to allow some harm to the endangered mission blue
butterfly (Icaricia icaricides missionensis) from a new housing development
at San Bruno Mountain, California, in exchange for a habitat preservation
and enhancement agreement.'
The 1982 Amendments also altered the manner in which the ESA
applies the "no jeopardy" criterion in section 7 consultation. Congress
created an "incidental take statement" to be applied to section 7 in much the
same manner as the incidental take permit.'3 After 1982, agencies that
receive "no jeopardy" biological opinions may receive incidental take
statements that authorize an otherwise prohibited section 9 take.86 These
statements come with conditions called "reasonable and prudent measures"
that bind the agency.8 7 When the agency action is to issue a permit, the
reasonable and prudent measures condition the permitted activity.'3
The top headline for ESA developments of the past decade is the
growth of the HCP program through the issuance of incidental take permits.
Up until 1992, the Services had issued only 14 permits.8 9 Since 1992, the
Services have issued almost 400 new permits.90 Similar to the manner in
79 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000).
8o 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2000).
81 Id § 1532(19).
82 Id § 1539(a)(2)(A).
83 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 97-835, at 30-32 (1982)
84 Id; see also Albert C. Lin, Parficipants'Experiences wlth Habitat Conservation Plans and
Suggestions for Streamlinng the Process, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 369, 374-76 (1996). The court upheld
the San Bruno Mountain permit and HCP in Friends of Endangered Species v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d
976, 988-89 (9th Cir. 1985).
85 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2000).
86 Id. § 1536(b)(4).
87 Id § 1536(b)(4)(C)(ii), (iv).
8 Id
89 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE AND NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLANNING HANDBOOK i (1996).
90 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING, at
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which the discharge prohibition functions as a tool primarily to control
rather than to eliminate the addition of pollutants to water, the take
prohibition now functions as a tool to control habitat degradation rather
than to prevent it.
The important gap in this analogy between the ESA and a classic
pollution control statute is that in the ESA there remains a larger disparity
between the capability of the permitting program and the Act's ultimate
goal-recovery of the ecosystems upon which listed species depend." In the
CWA, the disparity between permitting and eliminating discharge slowly
closes as technology-based effluent standards set zero discharge limits
unless they are not economically feasible.9" Also, ambient water quality
standards are designed to promote incremental improvements over time,
which may further reduce discharges.9" In the ESA, the Services do not
require incidental take permits to make progress toward recovery.94 The
incidental take permit is more oriented toward mitigating harm to species
than toward improving their status.
This is one important reason why the next step in the development of
the ESA program should be the adoption of permit standards that demand
progress toward species recovery. Elsewhere, I have proposed more creative
use of section 4(d) rules under the ESA as a tool for achieving both more
effective cooperative federalism and permitting.95 For the purposes of this
Article, I will note only that those areas where the ESA fails to fully utilize
statutory tools common to other environmental laws represent a menu of
options for effective reform. Before prescribing some of those reforms,
however, the next section sounds a cautionary note on the topic of
predicting the direction of developments in statutory law.
C. Conclusion
What does it mean for the ESA to be a hybrid of resource management
and pollution control laws? For one thing, it makes the ESA a useful
http://endangered.fws.gov/hcp/index.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2004).
91 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000).
92 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000) (stating the goals of the Clean Water Act).
93 Id §§ 1251(a), 1313(c) (providing for periodic review of water quality). One must be
careful to avoid comparing the ESA program, in practice, to the CWA program, in design. In
practice, the water program has struggled to promote incremental improvements over time. See
ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL, THE CLEAN WATER ACT 20 YEARS LATER (1993) (using real world
information to perform a comprehensive analysis of the successes and failures of the Clean
Water Act on a national scale); OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW,
POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION (1999) (elaborating on the mechanism for implementing the TMDL
program to control water pollution from nonpoint sources); Oliver A. Houck, Of BATs, Birds,
and B-A-T- The Convergent Evolution of Environmental Law, 63 Miss. L.J. 403, 425-26 (1994)
(describing problems encountered due to nonpoint source pollution from agriculture and storm
water runoff). But the CWA program is nonetheless more highly evolved than the ESA program
in maintaining incentives for and achieving some continual progress toward statutory goals.
94 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE AND NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, supra note 89, at
3-20.
95 Fischman & Hal-Rivera, supra note 78, at 168.
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indicator of the broad trends in environmental law. Because it covers such
wide ground, the ESA manifests a wider range of programmatic attributes
than most environmental laws.
Moreover, the ESA's hybrid status might endow it with a hardiness that
allows for prompter adaptation. Because the statute provides administrators
with so many kinds of tools for implementation, much is possible without
statutory revision. The nimbleness of the ESA is best illustrated by its
comparative success in incorporating the so-called "second-generation" and
regulatory flexibility innovations.9" The use of habitat conservation plans,
candidate conservation agreements, and safe harbor agreements has
significantly altered the administrative landscape of the ESA.9 7 In contrast,
EPA's attempts to implement regulatory reform through such programs as
Project XL and the Environmental Achievement Track,9" have barely made a
dent in pollution control implementation.
m. THE DIRECTOR'S CUT: THREE ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF THE PAST
The ESA is one of the only statutes that tracks changes in both the
resource management and pollution control branches of environmental law.
So, one way to venture predictions about the future of the ESA is to observe
what has been happening to environmental law generally. This section
examines three interpretations of the trends in environmental law.
The record for predicting how the ESA will play out should chasten all
but the bold or foolish.99 The legislative history of the 1973 statute indicates
strongly that the expectations of contemporary commentators were
unreliable in forecasting the future development of this legal program. The
1973 drafters who thought they were creating an endangered species
protection program that would focus on cooperative agreements prompting
states to assume the primary, on-the-ground role in recovery efforts were far
off the mark. The other principal concerns of the 1973 discussion, i.e.,
96 For a thorough review of these regulatory reform ideas, see The National Symposium on
Second Generation En vironmental Polcy and the Law, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (200 1).
97 For a description of these programs, see Peter Aengst et al., Introduction to Habitat
Conservation Planning, 14 ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE Nos. 7 & 8, at 9 (1997), available at
http://www.umich.edu/-esupdate/library/97.07-08/hcp.htnml; Patrick Parenteau, Rearranging the
Deck Chairs: Endangered Species Act Reforms In an Era of Mass Extinction, 22 WM. & MARY
ENV'rL. L. & POL'Y REV. 227, 285 (1998) (describing the Interior Department's attempts to
improve administration of the ESA through cooperation, negotiation, and voluntary
agreements); J.B. Ruh], Who Needs Congress? An Agenda for Administrative Reform of the
Endangered Species Act; 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 367, 382-87 (1998) (detailing various ecosystem
approach policies in administrative reform); Karin P. Sheldon, Habitat Conservation Planning
Addressing the Achilles Heel of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 279, 337-40
(1998) (reviewing the history and effectiveness of habitat conservation plans).
98 For a description of these programs, see Dennis D. Hirsch, The National Symposium on
Second Generation Policy and the New Economy, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2001).
99 This very journal published an article upon the passage of the ESA that predicted the take
prohibition would not be interpreted so broadly as to apply to indirect harms caused by habitat
degradation. Rudy Lachenmeier, The Endangered Species Act of 1973: Preservation or
Pandemonium 5 ENvTL. L. 29 (1974).
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creating different levels of protection for endangered species than for
threatened species, and improving land acquisition authority, quickly
dissipated in the rough and tumble of implementation.
One benefit we have in 2003 that commentators in 1973 lacked is the
evidence of a trajectory created by thirty additional years of environmental
law. In predicting the future, we might look at where we have been, and
where we are, and trace that arc forward into the future. This Section
describes three common views of the trajectory of environmental law. I
characterize the three views in stereotypical terms because I believe it is
useful to separate out and highlight the three very different strains of
historical interpretation. Putting aside the question of whether the future
direction of any law can be predicted from its past, this section highlights
the difficulty of even finding a coherent direction in the past behavior of the
law.
In the current debates over the ESA there are some common
misconceptions about the law's history. For instance, one of the most
prevalent contemporary criticisms of the ESA is that it overreaches in
protecting a wide taxonomic range of species.100 Typical of this kind of
criticism is the 2001 statement from former Rep. James V. Hansen (R-Utah),
who served in Congress from 1980 to 2003:
In 1973, no member of Congress could envision application of the [ESA] as it
has evolved. The congressional vision of "endangered species" was largely
limited to eagles, whooping cranes, and perhaps, grizzly bears. There was no
anticipation that the [ESA] would be applied to species of flies, mussels, snails,
or snakes.10
1
The historical record clearly contradicts this view. Though the 1966 and 1969
predecessors to the ESA were weak, they did authorize the Interior
Department to publish lists of imperiled species.12 By 1973, the list included
a snail (Papustyla pulcherrima), salamanders, a toad (Bufo houstonensis),
two species of boas, one garter snake (Thanmophis sirtalis tetrataenia), a
blunt-nosed leopard lizard (Gambeia silus), a humpback chub (Gila cypha),
four species of darters, a pikerninnow (Ptychocheilus lucius), a topminnow
(Poeciliopsis occidentais), bats, a salt marsh harvest mouse
100 See, e.g., Hanna Rosin, Fern Trampling, NEW REPUBLIC, July 3, 1995, at 12 (quoting Rep.
Don Young (D-Alaska), who voted for the ESA in 1973, as stating, "We had envisioned trying to
protect, you know, pigeons and things like that.... We never thought about mussels and ferns
and flowers and all these ... subspecies of squirrels and birds."); Hansen files Landmark Bill to
Restore Original Intent of Endangered Species Act; SIERRA TIMES, Nov. 13, 2002, available at
http://www.sierratimes.com/02/11/14/arstlll402.htm (quoting Rep. James V. Hansen (R-Utah),
"Congress crafted this law nearly 40 years ago to protect large species like the grizzly, wolf and
bald eagle from extinction."). Both Representatives Young and Hansen have served as chairmen
of the House Resources Committee.
101 James V. Hansen, Endangered Economies: An Alternative Approach to Compliance with
the Endangered Species Act Is Restoring Endangered Fish in the Colorado and San Juan Rivers,
16 F. APPLiED RES. & PUB. POL'Y 45, 46 (2001).




(Reithrodontomys raviventris), and the Delmarva Peninsula fox squirrel
(Sciurus niger cinereus).113 The 1969 Endangered Species Conservation Act
explicitly defined "fish and wildlife" to include reptiles, amphibians,
mollusks, and crustaceans.""° The 1973 ESA, which added plants to the list of
life forms eligible for listing, defined "fish and wildlife" to mean "any
member of the animal kingdom, including, without limitation any mammal,
fish, bird... amphibian, reptile, mollusk, crustacean, arthropod or other
invertebrate." 105 The only animal not eligible for protection under the
definitional section of the 1973 act is an insect determined to be a pest
whose protection "would present an overwhelming and overriding risk to
man." 106 The 1973 legislative history includes many references to the then-
existing list of imperiled species, which numbered 109 in the United States
and 300 overseas. 10 7
There is some truth to all three of the historical stories told in the
following sections. After all, the stories are as much about the values of the
story-tellers as they are about the historical facts. Depending on whether
one regards it as a good development, the congressional retreat from
environmental lawmaking may indicate either a fall from grace or an upward
arc.
Also, the three views are not entirely exclusive of each other. For
instance, commentators may describe a short-term cyclical variation in
environmental programs but nonetheless discern a larger trend. The point of
this part of the Article is not to assert that one must subscribe to one view or
another before venturing predictions about the future of the ESA. Rather, it
is to show that one's view of the past will shape one's prediction for the
future.
A. The Fall from Grace
One common view of the history of environmental law is the fall from
grace. In this framework, there was a golden era in the early- to mid-1970s
when Congress adopted and agencies implemented environmental law with
a vigilance unequaled since. The history of environmental law therefore is a
sad tale of the steady decline from those halcyon days. Over time, goals
recede, enforcement weakens, exceptions proliferate, and needless
complexity grows.
103 35 Fed. Reg. 16,047-48 (Oct. 13, 1970) (Appendix D listing endangered fish and wildlife);
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION ONLINE SYSTEM, at
http://ecos.fws.gov/tesspublic/TESSWebpage (last visited Apr. 11, 2004) (database of
threatened and endangered species by listing date); see BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 51, at 199
("It was evident by 1973 that the problem of endangerment was not limited to vertebrates,
mollusks, and crustaceans, but affected virtually all phyla of animals and plants.").
104 Pub. L. No. 91-135, § 7(a), 83 Stat. 275, 279-81 (1969).
105 Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 3(5), 87 Stat. 884, 885 (1973) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1532(8) (2000)).
106 Id. § 3(4) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2000)).
107 S. REP. No. 93-307, at 2 (1973).
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A good example of this view is Michael Blumm's 2001 essay reflecting
on the past twenty years of environmental law.' Blumm contrasts the
congressional retreat of the 1980s and 90s' 1° with the "dizzying period of
significant environmental legislative enactments""10 that preceded it. His
discussion supports his hypothesis that the 1970s "may come to be called the
golden age."' Blumm joins a host of other commentators who mourn the
loss, or even reversal, of momentum from the 1970s. I12
B. Onward and Upward
A second view of the same history interprets the events in a more
optimistic light. In this view, history is a story of progressive improvement.
Though we may never reach our aspirational goals in environmental law, we
get closer and closer every decade. This "Whiggish" view that environmental
law is a journey of incremental progress eschews any need for radical
reordering, which might sacrifice the gains made in the past.113 The Whig
narratives generally follow the same outline: Dramatic environmental
degradation (e.g., flaming rivers, oil-slicked beaches, killer smog) led to
governmental action that abated the worst offenders. Diligent but imperfect
agency implementation extended the environmental controls to an ever-
increasing number of sources. But, over time, significant marginal
environmental improvements are more difficult to find. The current tasks
involve fine-tuning existing controls. To the extent that population or
consumption increases create greater environmental impacts, technological
innovation can solve the attendant problems.
Not surprisingly, the historical accounts of the environmental agencies
tend to follow this view. After all, the Whig approach seeks to protect the
accumulated wisdom embodied in these institutions. Most accounts of the
past thirty years of environmental law that emanate from the Environmental
108 Michael C. Blumm, Twenty Years of Environmental Law: Role Reversals Between
Congress and the Executive, Judicial Activism Undermining the Environment, and the
Proliferation of Environmental (andAnti-Environmental) Groups, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 5 (2001).
109 Id. at 6.
110 Id. at 5.
111 Id at 15.
112 See, e.g., MARK DOWIE, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM AT THE CLOSE OF
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 8 (1995) (noting that environmental law and policy entered a
.relatively fruitless" phase after 1981); Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the
Graying of the United States Environmental Law. Reflections on Environmental Law's First
Three Decades in the Unites States, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 105 (2001) (concluding that the
"greatest challenge" to current environmental law is the need to recapture the original passion
and purpose of the 1970s); Kal Raustiala, The Political Implications of the Enforcement
Provisions of the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement The CEC as a Model for Future
Accords, 25 ENVTL. L. 31, 44 (1995) (referring to the "golden age of environmental regulation").
113 The Whig philosophy originates with the writings of Edmund Burke. Suzanna Sherry,
Judges of Character, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 794 (2003). The Whig interpretation of history
is "the tendency in many historians.., to emphasise certain principles of progress in the past
and to produce a story which is the ratification if not the glorification of the present." HERBERT
BUTTERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY v (W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 1965) (1931).
See also CHARLES VAN DOREN, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1967).
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Protection Agency or the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) fall in
this category. The CEQ not-quite-annual reports on "Environmental Quality"
are a chronicle of Whig optimism. 114 Their tone is summed up by the
conclusion of the twentieth anniversary report released in 1990:
[T]he experience of the past two decades... suggests that Americans in 2010
will respond to environmental problems with energy, creativity, and a deep-
seated sense of responsibility for future generations. Americans believe
strongly that environmental quality is an essential component of their long-term
health and economic prosperity. They have demonstrated that they have the
will to protect environmental quality and the capacity to act. The lessons of the
past 20 years can give all Americans hope for the future. 115
Commentators such as Roderick Nash view the history of
environmental law as part of a progressive expansion of the moral universe
of rights-holders." 6 Others see improvement in the steady incorporation of
the developing science of ecology."' A wider range of commentators, the
most recently celebrated (and scorned) of whom is Bjorn Lomborg, I" s tell an
optimistic tale of physical environmental improvement, particularly
correlated with increased affluence and technology.119
C. The Roller Coaster
A third view of the history of environmental law is that it is a pendulum
or roller coaster. I prefer the roller coaster metaphor because its ups and
downs are irregular. Like legal and political history, roller coasters may
change direction with a jolt. On the other hand, the pendulum metaphor
perceptively suggests the dynamic of reactive forces continually pulling
swings through the middle. 2 0
114 The CEQ reports are required by NEPA. 42 U.S.C. § 4344(2) (2000) (requiring that CEQ
.gather timely and authoritative information concerning the conditions and trends in the quality
of the environment"); id § 4344(7) (requiring that CEQ "report at least once each year to the
President on the state and condition of the environment").
115 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 13 (1989).
116 RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE: A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 4-
12 (1989).
117 RICHARD 0. BROOKS ET AL., LAW AND ECOLOGY: THE RISE OF THE ECOSYSTEM REGIME 2-36,
397 (2002).
118 See generally Symposium on Bjorn Lomborg's The Skeptical Environmentalist, 53 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 249 (2002).
119 BJORN LOMBORG, THE SKEFFICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL STATE OF THE
WORLD 2001; GREGG EASTERBROOK, A MOMENT ON EARTH: THE COMING AGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
OvrumsM (1995); THE STATE OF HUMANITY (Julian L. Simon ed., 1994); THE RESOURCEFUL EARTH
(Julian L. Simon & Herman Kahn eds., 1984). Most of these commentaries, however, give little
credit to environmental law as having anything to do with environmental improvement. On
technological optimism, see James E. Krier & Clayton P. Gillette, The Un-Easy Case for
Technological Optimism, 84 MICH. L. REV. 405 (1985).
120 William D. Ruckelshaus, Stopping the Pendulum, Speech Delivered at the Environmental
Law Institute's Annual Awards Dinner (Oct. 18, 1995) ("The anti-environmental push of the
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Commentators look at the cycles of environmental history at different
scales. Long, low frequency changes may occur with generational transfers
of power.'' Rapid-fire shifts may occur with the two-year cycle of
congressional elections. 122 Oscillation in judicial theories, enforcement
aggressiveness, administrative innovation, the state's role in cooperative
federalism, and congressional committee leadership occurs at intervals
somewhere between these two extremes.
Compared with the other two views of history, which at least point in a
direction to watch for future changes, the roller coaster offers little guidance
for predictions. On average, over the long term, a roller coaster ends up
about where it starts.
IV. PRESCRIPTIONS FOR ESA RECOVERY
Though we may despair at predicting what the next thirty years might
deliver to the ESA, it is worthwhile to delineate the needs for a successful
anti-extinction program. The experience of the past three decades highlights
persistent shortcomings that hinder progress toward species recovery.
Moreover, any prescription for ESA reform must grapple with shifts in the
threats to biodiversity that accompany societal change.
Most parts of the United States have experienced at least 200 years of
habitat modification at the hands of intensive human activities. It is
unrealistic to expect a single statute to undo those harms in a matter of a
few decades. The relatively small number of recovery successes under the
ESA counsels reforms for the program. But it also counsels greater patience
for the slow process of arresting the most degrading activities and restoring
habitat. The trick will be to remain mindful of the long-term goals while
establishing realistic benchmarks for measuring success.
My proverbial three wishes for the ESA would provide the statute with
what it needs to succeed: funding, technology-based regulation, and
preventive biodiversity conservation. The sections that follow describe these
three prescriptions for bringing vigor to imperiled species recovery
specifically and biodiversity conservation generally.
A. Fumding the Program
There is no getting around the money issue. The ESA has never
received adequate funding to fulfill its objectives. As with other
environmental laws, the agencies charged with implementing the ESA do not
nineties is prompted by the pro-environmental excesses of the late eighties, which was
prompted by the anti-environmental excesses of the early eighties, which was prompted by the
pro-environmental excesses of the seventies ."), available at
http://csis.org/e4e/pendulum.html.
121 J. William Futrell, The History of Environrental Law, in SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW: INTEGRATING NATURAL RESOURCE AND POLLUTION ABATEMENT LAw FROM RESOURCES TO
RECOVERY 6-8 (Celia Campbell-Mohn et al. eds., 1993).
122 M. Neil Browne & Nancy K. Kubasek, A Communitarian Green Space Between Market
and Political Rhetoric About Environmental Law, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 127, 127 (1999).
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have adequate budgets to perform well. There is a pattern of under-funding
programs that self-fulfills the prophesy of federal environmental law failure.
The squalid state of ESA funding is a particularly vivid illustration of
this insidious dynamic. For years, agency budgets for listing and designation
of critical habitat have fallen short of what is needed to meet the mandates
of the statute.123 This tenuous situation prompts lawsuits asking courts to
force the Services to respond to particular petitions. In short order, the
agencies expend their entire budgets responding to outside litigation
priorities rather than their own. 124 Some critics have used this frustrating
situation to argue for limitations on judicial review. 125 But the real solution is
to give the Services the resources they need to do their jobs in identifying
and listing species on the brink of extinction, designating critical habitat,
and preparing adequate recovery plans. There is more than a little hypocrisy
in calling for the federal government to act only on the basis of "sound" or
"peer reviewed" science, 12 6 but not supporting the significant budget
increases necessary to carry out high quality research.
Even putting aside the funding required to list species, designate
habitat, and conduct consultation, the costs of species recovery alone justify
a bleak view of funding. A 1990 Interior Department report estimated the
total cost for recovery of listed species to be $4.6 billion.127 The number of
listed species has doubled since that time.
123 See, e.g., Sean O'Connor, Comment, The Rio Grande Sllvery Minnow and the Endangered
Species Act 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 673, 726 (2002) (discussing budget shortfalls under several
administrations).
124 See, e.g., Natalie M. Henry, FWS Gains Extra Year to Finish Largest Ever Critical Habitat
Designation, LAND LETTER, Oct. 16, 2003, item 9 (reporting that the critical habitat designation
for bull trout (Salvelinus confluentus) mandated by a court order will consume more than 25%
of the Service's 2004 critical habitat budget, and that the agency exhausted its 2003 critical
habitat budget in May); see also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 20, at 27 (finding
that litigation drives the listing program's priorities); Natalie M. Henry, Resources Panel to
Review FWS, NOAA Budget Requests, ENVIRONMENT & ENERGY DAILY, Apr. 30, 2001 (reporting
that the F.Y. 2001 budget for listing and critical habitat was depleted after only two months due
to litigation-driven deadlines).
125 In April 2001, the Bush Administration requested a budget rider to eliminate the judicially
enforceable listing and critical habitat deadlines. Douglas Jehl, Moratorium Asked on Suits that
Seek to Protect Species, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2001, at Al; Natalie M. Henry, Resources Panel to
Review FWS, NOAA Budget Requests, ENVIRONMENT & ENERGY DAILY, Apr. 30, 2001. The Clinton
Administration was no more enthusiastic about designating critical habitat. Bruce Babbitt, Bush
Isn't All Wrong About the Endangered Species Act N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2001, at Dll; Heather
Weiner, Golng Through the Motions: Fish & Wildlife Service's Critical Habitat Moratorium,
ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE, May 1, 1998, at 40.
126 See Information Quality Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153 to 154
(2000); Office of Management and Budget, Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and Information
Quality, 68 Fed. Reg. 54,023 (Sept. 15, 2003); U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service and National Oceanic
& Atmospheric Administration, Endangered & Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Notice of
Interagency Cooperative Policy for Peer Review in Endangered Species Act Activities, 59 Fed.
Reg. 34,270 (July 1, 1994).
127 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, REP. No. 90-98,
AUDIT REPORT: THE ENDANGERED SPECIES PROGRAM 11 (1990), available at
http://www.sw-center.org/swcbd/activist/ESAFWSAudit1990.pdf.
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Land acquisition has always been an important part of federal species
recovery efforts. It seems quaint now that the Endangered Species
Preservation Act of 1966128 anticipated that we could recover endangered
species solely by purchasing habitat for the national wildlife refuge system.
The 1973 legislative history, though it added a dollop of consultation and
prohibition to the programmatic mix, shows that Congress continued to
believe that the Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) would provide
needed monies for habitat reserves. The past thirty years have proven that
belief to be unfounded.
The failure of Congress to appropriate fully LWCF receipts is a broken
promise"' from the 1964 law, which earmarked receipts from motor boat
fuels taxes and other sources. LWCF dollars now come primarily from
leasing the outer continental shelf for oil and gas development. 30 I do not
wish to underestimate the good that the LWCF has done with its slimmed
down appropriations. William H. Rodgers, Jr. is on firm ground in
nominating the LCWF Act for the most significant U.S. environmental law. 131
At the time he wrote, in 1994, the fund had supplied $6.8 billion primarily for
acquisition of land. 32 But the unappropriated accumulation of LWCF monies
totals some $13 billion.133
Congress described the LWCF land acquisition objective in terms of
outdoor recreation,13 but subsequent legislation, beginning with the 1966
Endangered Species Preservation Act and continuing through the 1973 ESA,
expanded the uses of the LWCF to include habitat protection. Habitat
protection needs to be the top priority for any revision of the ESA. Habitat
degradation and destruction contributes to the risk of extinction for 85% of
imperiled species. 3
5
The habitat needs of many listed species are dauntingly large. For
instance, some birds breed exclusively in tracts of habitat that are many
times larger than the size of their territory. 3 6 Salmon in the Columbia River
basin travel from the sea to breed in tributaries that fan out over 260,000
128 Pub. L. No. 89-669, §§ 1-3, 80 Stat. 926, 926-27.
129 Glicksman and Coggins argue that it is also a breach of a public trust responsibility.
Robert L. Glicksman & George Cameron Coggins, Federal Recreational Land Pollcy. The Rise
and Decline of the Land and Water Conservation Flind, 9 CoLuM. J. ENVrL. L. 125, 128 (1984).
130 Pub. L. No. 88-578, § 2, 78 Stat. 897, 897-99 (1964); Pub. L. No. 90-401, 82 Stat. 354 (1968)
(setting up a special account for state and federal land acquisition funded by certain revenue
sources, most notably receipts from off-shore oil and gas leases). The receipts from outer
continental shelf oil and gas were added to the fund in 1968 amendments. See U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-199SP, FEDERAL TRUST AND OTHER EARMARKED FUNDS: ANSWERS TO
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 56 (2001), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01l199sp.pdf.
131 Rodgers, supra note 54, at 1010.
132 Id.
133 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 130, at 56.
134 16 U.S.C. § 4601-4 (2000).
135 David S. Wilcove et al., Quantifying Threats to Imperiled Species in the United States, 48
BIOSCIENCE 607, 607-08 (1998); see also REED F. NOSS ET AL., THE SCIENCE OF CONSERVATION
PLANNING: HABITAT CONSERVATION UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 2 (1997); NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 7, 35-38, 40,94 (1995).
136 NOSS ET AL., supra note 135, at 4.
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square miles. 3 7 Migratory birds and salmon also illustrate how some species
depend on different types of habitat (e.g., breeding, feeding, resting) in
different places at different times.
The relationship between federal funding and habitat protection goes
beyond acquisition. Because securing habitat for listed species on private
land creates the most intense conflicts under the ESA, various forms of
subsidies to encourage and compensate landowners for better management
will be required for long-term recovery of a substantial number of species.
Short of outright purchases of land, an essential part of the ESA prescription
should be money to support better private habitat management.
Certainly, some areas contain such sensitive habitat that acquisition is
the most appropriate federal response for species protection. However, the
vast majority of habitat should and will remain in private ownership where
economic and residential activity can coexist with the needs of wildlife and
plants. The key issue on these lands is appropriate management. Here,
federal funding will play an important role.
Some money for habitat management currently goes to states under the
ESA section 6 cooperative agreements. However, the scale of federal
payments to address the extinction problem must increase dramatically,
probably to levels equivalent to agricultural subsidies. The federal
government subsidizes farming to the tune of some $20 billion annually. 38
J.B. Ruhl has sensibly suggested shifting the current agricultural price
supports to a "green" subsidy program that would tie payments to
environmental performance.3 9
Incentives, essentially payment for ecological services rendered, will be
needed to supplement any foreseeable regulation under the ESA. No great
conceptual chasms need be leaped to fill this prescription. All it takes is
money. The Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) already has
partnerships with local conservation districts to serve just about every
county of the nation and can work with landowners to improve habitat
management. 4 ° The NRCS currently does this in a limited way through the
Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP), in which it pays landowners to enhance
wetlands on marginal agricultural lands.' The NRCS also offers technical
assistance and cost-share for wetland restoration.'42 This is exactly the kind
137 CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE FUTURE OF
THE WEST 180-81 (1992). For a description of salmon conservation issues generally, see Michael
C. Blumm & Greg D. Corbin, Salmon and the Endangered Species Act: Lessons from the
Columbia Basin, 74 WASH. L. REV. 519 (1999).
138 J.B. Ruhl, Three Questions for Agiculture About the Environment, 17 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 395, 405 (2002) (citing NORMAN MEYERS & JENNIFER KENT, PERVERSE SUBSIDIES 44-50
(2001)).
139 Id at 408.
140 NATURAL RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, ABOUT
Us, athttp://www.nrcs.usda.gov/about/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2004).
141 NATURAL RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
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of program we need on a larger scale for endangered species habitat
restoration.
After habitat restoration, the next most severe anthropocentric threat
to listed species is the introduction of non-native species and the spread of
diseases carried by them. Programs to eradicate invasive species could be
funded through a cost-share program very similar to the WRP. The federal
government should offer direct financial rewards for landowners willing to
produce a non-native species control plan.
Investing federal dollars in species recovery would likely yield other
benefits. For instance, the same management practices that maintain and
restore salmon spawning watersheds would also help states achieve
nonpoint source controls for water pollution. Our legal tools to control
nonpoint source pollution have been inadequate for many of the same
reasons that the tools to accomplish recovery under the ESA have. In this
respect, the cross-cutting nature of endangered species problems works
both ways. Not only are endangered species indicators of broader ecological
problems, but ESA recovery solutions will likely repair damage to the health
of land, water, and (to a lesser extent) air.
Of course, advocates for every government program complain about
inadequate budgets. In addition, the resumption of federal deficit spending
bodes ill for any short-term relief from budget austerity.1" Yet the unhappy
truth is that recovery is expensive. Even if we retain the stricter regulatory
standards established in the Act, which employ sticks rather than financial
carrots to protect habitat, federal spending for conservation biology and
ESA implementation will have to rise as the magnitude of the extinction
problem continues to grow.
B. Technology-Based Limitations to Protect Habitat
The federal government cannot and should not pay for everything that
abates harm to imperiled species. Some activities should be minimized,
controlled, or even prohibited, through regulation. One of the chief
weaknesses of the ESA's regulatory framework under both section 7 and
section 9 is that it relies on determinations of the effects of specific
activities. Section 7 requires the Services to determine whether the proposed
federal action jeopardizes the continued existence of the species or
adversely modifies critical habitat." Section 9 requires the Services to
determine, most often, whether a take has occurred through significant
habitat modification or degradation that actually injures wildlife by
significantly impairing essential behavior patterns. 145
Such determinations are generally beyond the ability of the Services, or
anyone for that matter, to make without reference to extensive information
143 The forecast for better state funding of habitat conservation is even bleaker. See Erik
Ness, Dodging the Budget Ax, 1 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV'T 172 (2003) (noting that state
environmental programs are commonly targeted for budget cuts in times of economic crisis).
144 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000).
145 Id § 1538(a); 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2004).
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that does not typically exist and that would be very expensive to produce.146
One response to this shortcoming of the existing ESA is to fund the scientific
research necessary to make more credible determinations, as this Article
suggests in the previous section. Another important response, however, is
evident from the approach of pollution control law: Implement technology-
based limitations.
As Oliver Houck has observed, the clear trend in the development of
pollution abatement law has been away from controls and standards that
place unreasonable information demands on agencies. 4 ' Over time, the most
effective regulations are the ones that establish a uniform standard on all
activities of a similar type. Although there may be some modification of the
uniform standard for special, site-specific circumstances, the baseline
regulation calls for everyone to do what they can to abate as much pollution
as possible before receiving the governmental green light (generally, a
permit). Controlling degrading activities through uniform standards of
behavior also reveals the moral dimension of environmental law. 148
One important reason why so many ESA disputes revolve around
logging, agriculture (including ranching), and residential or commercial land
development (the sectors I will call the "Big Three") is that these are the
most important non-service areas of the economy that generally escape
regulation under the pollution control laws. Activities subject to the
pollution control statutes are relatively uncontroversial from an ESA
perspective because they are already regulated under those other
environmental laws. Where pollution control regulation does the heavy
lifting, often what remains necessary for the ESA program is slight. But, for
the Big Three, exemptions and exclusions have left the ESA with a
tremendous challenge to control habitat degradation.
True, the CWA is making tentative, halting baby steps toward
controlling nonpoint source pollution from the Big Three sectors. 149 But it
may be the fate of the ESA to carry the banner at the vanguard of federal
regulation of these industries. If the ESA leads the way, this will likely be the
most significant contribution that the ESA has ever made to environmental
law.
Certainly, there are intimiudating political hurdles to regulating the Big
Three sectors, but those hurdles are beyond the scope of this Article. I am
examining what the ESA needs, not what the ESA is likely to get. More
important to this discussion are feasibility problems in adapting technology-
based limitations to the ESA.
In part, the lack of federal environmental regulation of the Big Three
results from the traditional deference to states on issues of land use. It is
true that the Big Three are land intensive. But there is no reason to deny the
federal interest in these sectors of the economy while allowing federal law
146 See J.B. Ruhl, The Battle over Endangered Species Act Methodology, 34 ENVrL. L. 555,
589-91 (2004).
147 Houck, supra note 93.
148 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 259 (2d ed. 1994).
149 See HOUCK, supra note 93.
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to control other sectors that similarly contribute to national markets in
goods.
A stronger justification for the current exemption for the Big Three in
environmental law is that they involve such a diversity of site-specific
activities that they cannot be sub-categorized adequately to tailor
technology-based limitations. 5 ° Although there is some truth to this
rationale, there are nonetheless common, distinguishable subcategories
within each of the Big Three (e.g., large-scale crop irrigation or concentrated
animal feeding operations (CAFOs)) that are susceptible to generalizations
about how to minimize effects on biological diversity.1
5 1
The term "technology-based" limitations comes from the pollution
control field of environmental law. A better term for the ESA might be
"behavior-based" or "activity-based" limitations. Unlike the pollution control
area, where chemical abatement often requires quite technologically
sophisticated machinery,1 52 many of the analogous approaches for species
recovery are decidedly ordinary, including the following: riparian buffer
zones, slash management, hedgerows, tillage limitations, stormwater
abatement, and residential clustering. Many of these limitations are well
documented in the literature concerning voluntary "best management
practices" for nonpoint source water pollution control. 153
To a limited degree, the current incidental take permitting program can
accommodate these technology-based standards. But that program lacks
many of the attributes that make the pollution control permits so effective.
The incidental take program today fails to require progress toward the
recovery goal of the ESA, it lacks nationally uniform standards, it does not
provide assured avenues for public participation, and it neglects the
150 The CWA subdivides its domain into over 500 point source subcategories, each one of
which has a specified suite of technology-based pollution limitations. 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(A)
(2000).
151 See J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 263, 337 (2000) (concluding that "if a sector-based approach is used to identify farming
operations that exhibit high-impact polluting effects, such as CAFOs and large-scale crop
operations, conventional prescriptive regulation can yield significant environmental benefits at
manageable administrative cost levels").
152 See, e.g., U.S. EPA, Petroleum Refining Point Source Category Effluent Limitations
Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards, 47 Fed. Reg.
46,434, 46,446 (Oct. 18, 1982) (providing a final rule for technology-based effluent limitations on
petroleum refining). On the other hand, pollution control technology may be as simple as
placing screens on effluent pipes to trap solids. See, e.g., Ass'n of Pac. Fisheries v. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 615 F.2d 794, 805-09 (9th Cir. 1980) (assessing agency studies of costs and benefits of
screening as pollution control technology).
153 See, e.g., Terrence J. Centner et al., Employing Best Management Practices to Reduce
Agricultural Water Pollution: Economies, Regulatory Institutions, and Policy Concerns 45
DRAKE L. REV. 125 (1997); Larry C. Frarey, Toward the Development of Performance Criteria
Beyond Best Management Practices, 48 OKLA L. REV. 353 (1995); Neil C. Johnston & Richard
Eldon Davis, Permits, Best Management Practices, and Construction Sites: Don't Muddy the
Water, or Else!, 61 ALA. LAw. 330 (2000); Richard Whitman, Clean Water or Multiple Use? Best




potential for state implementation. 5" A revitalized ESA would need to
incorporate all of these attributes.
Several pollution control programs employ the promising tool of
general permits to cover a large number of relatively low-impact, similar
activities that, when aggregated, could diminish environmental quality if not
subject to some basic limitations.155 This relieves each individual activity
from the burden of applying for a site-specific permit unless special
circumstances create the need for closer scrutiny.'56 One leading casebook
describes the general permit approach to controlling stormwater discharges
through best management practices as "a model of regulatory efficiency." 157
Like incidental take permits, general permits for stormwater discharge
require permitees to develop plans of abatement. 58
For threatened species, I have argued that ESA section 4(d) provides
authority for the Services to craft a cooperative federal permit program that
can achieve what the pollution control programs have done. 15 9 Extending
such a scheme to all listed species requires statutory revision. But the
framework for controlling municipal, residential, commercial and industrial
(MRCI) development activities under the 4(d) rule promulgated in 2000 for a
group of anadromous fish in the Pacific Northwest provides a rough outline
for how ESA permitting might operate for land-disturbing activities. 16 0 The
federal government, in the rule and related guidance, sets out standards for
state and municipal land-use control programs to meet in order to receive
certification under the rule.16 ' If a land-use controlling jurisdiction can show
to the satisfaction of the federal overseer that its program (including plans,
local permits, and public restoration projects) meets the national standards,
then it receives certification. Private land-disturbing activities operating and
regulated under the certified program are insulated from take liability. So is
the local jurisdiction for those activities covered by the certified program.
Local jurisdictions have incentives to develop programs in order to retain
control over land use and to gain eligibility to receive federal funds.
154 Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note 78, at 78.
155 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 122.28 (2004) (allowing general permits for the CWA's national
pollutant discharge elimination system); 33 C.F.R. § 330 (2004) (allowing general, nationwide
permits for the CWA's dredge or fill permit program).
156 Karen M. Wardzinsld et al., National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit
Application and Issuance Procedures, in THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK 58, 59-60 (Parthenia
B. Evans ed., 1994).
157 ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POuCY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY
524 (2d ed. 1998).
158 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System-Regulations for Revision of the Water
Pollution Control Program Addressing Storm Water Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722, 68,754
(Dec. 8, 1999).
159 See also Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note 78, at 49, 73-89 (arguing that borrowing
"tools" from pollution control law by using section 4(d) benefits species conservation).
160 Final Rule Governing Take of 14 Threatened Salmon and Steelhead Evolutionarily
Significant Units (ESUs), 65 Fed. Reg. 42,422, 42,480 (July 10, 2000).
161 For instance, for MRCI development programs, the 2000 4(d) rule contains twelve
substantive standards, procedures for federal approval, and requirements for ongoing
evaluation of the effectiveness of implementation. Id.
[Vol. 34:451
ESA PREDICTIONS AND PRESCRIPTIONS
Therefore, the effectiveness of this particular tool depends both on credible
federal enforcement of sanctions and on availability of significant federal
funds.
Perhaps most importantly, employing cooperative federalism can marry
national behavior-based limitations to protect biodiversity with the wide
variety of local area-wide plans. In addition to delegating enforcement to
states, counties, and municipalities, this approach also encourages land-use
planning. If done on a large enough scale, and early enough, area-wide plans
can promote trades in hab-tat quality. This accommodates desperately
needed flexibility for land-use controls. It also leads to preventive
conservation that slows the pace of listing under the ESA.
C Preventive Health Care for Biod'versity
Though some endangered species are perched so close to the edge of
extinction that they can survive no more habitat modification or other harm,
much of our biodiversity is not in quite so dire a condition. The ESA
currently demands that we halt development because we do not take
reasonable measures until species are at a relatively high risk of
extinction.162 My final broad prescription for the ESA of the future is to
establish less draconian controls for biodiversity management that prevent
species from declining to the point at which there is little flexibility for
recovery. If we had a set of legal trip switches to slow unsustainable
practices before they reached the point of serious collapse, we would avoid
many of the train wrecks that have unfairly tarnished the image of the ESA.
As a program of last resort, we ought to rely less on the ESA and more on
new, preventive biodiversity health initiatives to address ecosystem
integrity.
One approach to providing flexible preventive health care for
biodiversity, as noted in the previous Section, is area-wide planning. The
larger the planning area, the more flexible are the trade-offs between, for
example, habitat on one side of a watershed and the other. Similarly, early
planning, before every last scrap of habitat is needed for a species to cling to
existence, also enables flexible trades. Plans allowing development in some
places and not in others can achieve fairness through relatively simple
trades. 63 Though candidate conservation agreements have begun to prompt
some early species protection efforts, they fall far short of the mark for
widespread, comprehensive planning.
Effective planning requires adequate funding, of course. But, it also
demands information. The ESA currently does a poor job of generating the
kind of information that people need to make good choices about activities
that might adversely affect biodiversity. The failure of Bruce Babbitt's
revival of the Progressive Era's Biological Survey denied the nation a
162 David S. Wilcove et al., What Exactly Is an Endangered Species? An Analysis of the US.
Endangered Species List: 1985-1991, 7 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 87, 92 (1993).
163 See, e.g., Michael J. Bean & Lynn E. Dwyer, Mitigation Bann as an Endangered Species
Conservation Tool, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,537 (2000).
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desperately needed source of comprehensive information about our natural
wealth. 64 Without information about the location, vigor, trends, and needs of
species, we have little hope of avoiding an ever-expanding endangered
species list. We also have little basis for establishing trading schemes that
ensure progress toward recovery.
Even for listed species, the ESA has not made the grade in prompting
agencies to meet their conservation duty to take affirmative steps to
promote recovery. 16' One reason is that, by the time a species is listed,
recovery is very difficult because the populations are so low and
vulnerable.166 Another key reason is the shortage of funds and regulatory
tools described in the previous two Sections. But all of these reasons are
related to a dim public and governmental awareness of the status of
biodiversity. Even what little information we do possess167 is not widely
understood.
My greatest hope for the future of the ESA is that it will promote better
understanding of the importance of species recovery both as a moral and as
an economic issue. Then, we will see its measures of success reflected in
agency strategic plans under the Government Performance and Results
Act, 6s in municipal land-use and development ordinances, and in
congressional budgetary priorities.
V. CONCLUSION
For such a little statute, the ESA gets a lot of attention. This is, in part,
because of its dramatic stewardship goal: We committed the law to
intervene to stop extinctions. Thus, the ESA must step into the political
thickets, such as land-use control, that other environmental laws evade.
While the ESA is our special tool of last resort to repair long-standing,
unsustainable situations, it also mirrors larger, controversial shifts in
environmental law and policy. It is folly to think we can cure the ills of the
ESA in isolation from the problems that beset the field of environmental law.
The ESA debates reflect the ongoing tension of the Act's dual
citizenship. It has allegiances both to regulatory pollution control law andproprietary resource management law. The tools from both these areas
sometimes mix uneasily. But the situation does make the ESA suitable for
borrowing tools, such as technology- (or, activity-) based limitations, from
pollution control law to achieve biodiversity protection.
164 Frederic H. Wagner, Whatever Happened to the National Biological Survey, 49
BIOSCIENCE 219, 219 (1999).
165 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (2000).
166 Wilcove, supra note 162, at 88.
167 See, e.g., H. JOHN HEINZ, III, CENTER FOR SCIENCE, ECONOMICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, THE
STATE OF THE NATION'S ECOSYSTEMS: MEASURING THE LANDS, WATERS, AND LIVING RESOURCES OF
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This Article imagines what it would really take to meet the objectives of
the ESA. In order to plot a strategic direction for reform, we need to think
over a longer term than just the next round of foreseeable regulatory or
statutory revisions. Supporters of the ESA have been fighting to stave off
hostile interpretations and amendments for so long that their energy for
visionary advocacy has waned. Environmentalists may need to abandon
some defensive battles in order to win the war for recovery by articulating a
bold affirmative agenda. Substantial new funding, regulation of the Big
Three, and flexible conservation plans to prevent listings must be a part of
this visionary strategy.
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